Supply Chain Network Optimization for Efficient and Resilient Network Pooling

Summary of Project
The work done over the course of this project can be split into two parts: a research portion
exploring transshipment games and different ways of analyzing them, as well as a programming
portion, where one of these analysis strategies was implemented to provide results for a certain
scenario of a transshipment game.
Research
The focus of this project revolves around the concept of a transshipment game. A transshipment
game can be defined as a scenario where several players in a game (for example, several retail
stores) each either have an excess supply of a certain good, or an excess demand of that good.
Players with excess supply must find a way to sell the stock or turn it in for its much lower
salvage value, and players with demand must find a way to realize this potential profit or lose out
on the sales (Huang and Sošić, 4). Each player in this game must work with the other players to
trade excess stock or demand to utilize its potential value, but players will also take actions to
maximize their own profits as much as possible. In this way, the transshipment game is both
competitive and cooperative, with each player having an incentive to work with others to
increase their own gains (Anupindi, Bassok, and Zemel, 8).
In this situation, the players often form coalitions among themselves to secure pairings of excess
supply and excess demand. Each of these coalitions will have a total value associated with it, as
well as a payoff for each player, unless the coalition has no more possible pairings of supply and
demand (Anupindi, Bassok, and Zemel, 8). While each individual player will look at which
coalitions will be best for them, we can also objectively calculate how valuable each player is to

the other players in the game. One of the ways of calculating these values is with the Shapley
Value.

This Shapley Value equation will calculate the value that a single player has within the set of
players. The components of the equation are as follows (Ferguson, 15):
i: The subject player, for which we are finding the Shapley Value
N : The total number of players in the game
S : The current set of players (current coalition)
v(S): Value of the current set of players
v(S ∪ {i}): Value of current set of players including subject player i
The Shapley Value calculation essentially visits every coalition that does not include the player i,
and records how much value is added to the coalition by including player i (if any). This value is
weighted based on the size of the current coalition and the total number of players, and each
value is summed together to generate the Shapley Value for the player i. This value represents
how valuable this player is to other coalitions in general and can be considered as a factor for
how much profit should be allocated from the total profit pool to the player in question.
Another strategy for interpreting a transshipment game is the Nucleolus. The Nucleolus focuses
on minimizing the excesses that each player receives from the game, with the purpose of
stabilizing the differences in excesses between players, so that no player feels like they are the
worst off in the game. This technique uses the assumption that a player’s satisfaction comes from
comparing their excesses to the excesses of others, so satisfaction can be maximized when the
excesses for the game are minimized (Ferguson, 22).

Program Implementation of the Shapley Value
One of the initial goals for this research project was to develop a program in order to generate
Shapley Values from an input sets of players. The program creation was important because when
finding the Shapley Value by hand, the number of possible coalitions in a game experiences
factorial growth as more players are added, so larger games can quickly get out of hand for
performing this calculation. We decided to use Matlab for this implementation, as it should be
able to perform calculations on large amounts of data fairly easily.
In the scenario that we would be exploring for this program, each player will also have a selling
price per unit when they are able to match a supply with a demand, and each pair of players
involved will have a transshipment cost per unit shipped between them. The program itself
essentially will find every single possible coalition in a n-player game, apply the sales prices and
transshipment costs to calculate the values for each coalition, and then find the Shapley Value of
each player by checking what value each player would be bringing to every other coalition. With
this program, we can run scenarios of much larger and more complex games, see how changing
different aspects of the game affects the Shapley Values. We can also start to compare how the
Shapley Value interprets the game with how something like the Nucleolus would interpret it.
Results/Outcomes
The Shapley Value transshipment program provided many valuable insights into how this type of
game plays out. One of the main takeaways is that players with higher transshipment costs are
less valuable to other players, as other players would prefer to source their supply or demand
from players with lower costs in order to increase profits. In the situation that all the players have
the same transshipment costs and no other contributing factors to profit, any unit if supply or

demand from a player is just as good as any other player. A player with excess supply and a
higher salvage profits than any other supplier will have a slightly lower Shapley value than one
with lower salvage profits, as they will still gain something if they are not able to sell off their
supply, so they are somewhat less reliant on the other players.
One of the more interesting outcomes of the Shapley Value calculation is how the game values
the flexibility of players. A player with a larger amount of supply or demand will have more
potential for profit; however, that player will be a part of many coalitions where not all the units
of supply or demand can be utilized. A player with a lower supply or demand has less potential
for profit, but will be a member of many more coalitions where they will be able to utilize all of
that potential. Due to these conditions, players with relatively high supply or demand will often
have Shapley Values lower than their potential profit, while players with relatively low supply or
demand will often have Shapley Values higher than their potential profit.
Discussion of how project was accomplished
This project began with the goal of exploring different ways to approach transshipment games.
Initially, I was tasked with researching articles provided to me by my mentor, as well as
searching for more information on the topics. Once I had a fair understanding of the topic and the
relevant equations, I began to learn Matlab in order to implement one method of calculating the
results of a transshipment game. The process of creating this program involved thinking through
how the equation would function in Matlab, and included several unsuccessful attempts of that
implementation. However, I was able to create a functional program which can generate the
Shapley Values of a transshipment game with user input parameters.

Reflections
SEF was an experience that was and will continue to be very valuable to me in the future. It
provided me with an opportunity to work with a professor and learn about topics I may not have
been able to experience through my normal coursework. In my experience, SEF was also an
effective introduction into the world of academic research, exposing me to how the process
works and what is expected from everyone involved.
In this specific project, I became more involved in topic relating to my degree field of Industrial
and Systems Engineering, as well as having opportunities to learn new skills that will likely
benefit me through my academic and professional careers, such as Matlab and logical
implementations of math in programming.
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